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1.1 	Background of the Problem
The Parliament of Tanzania has made amendments to several Criminal Laws in Tanzania, among others introduced the Plea Bargain in Tanzania, its procedure and administration. In the recently passed Written Laws (Miscellaneous Amendments) Act​[1]​ numerous amendments were made including the Amendment of the Criminal Procedure Act.​[2]​  In a nutshell, plea bargaining is an agreement in a criminal case between the prosecutor and the accused whereby the accused agrees to plead guilty to a particular charge in return for some concession from the prosecutor. The concession can be by way to a reduced sentence.

In this process the accused agrees to plead guilty to a particular offence or a lesser offence or cooperate with the Prosecutor in the provision of information that may lead to a discovery of other information relating to the offence. This is done in return for a concession from the Prosecutor, which may lead to a lenient sentence or withdrawal of counts.​[3]​ Upon successful plea bargaining between prosecutors and accused the resultant is the plea agreement. The term plea agreement has been defined as an agreement entered into between the prosecution and the accused in a criminal trial per the provisions of the Criminal Procedure Act.​[4]​

Generally, there is a common notion that plea bargaining is necessarily beneficial to defendants. Defendants charged with more serious crimes and represented by private attorneys are more likely to go to trial than to be pleaded out. By contrast, very few factors influence trial outcomes, and the effect of race on these negotiations is fairly weak.​[5]​ Perhaps most important is the finding that most of the cases referred to the said bargaining resulted in acquittal, showing that guilt is not an issue for a conclusion which may provide influence to defendants in the plea-bargaining process. 

Before the recent amendment of the Criminal Procedure Act of Tanzania, an ordinary criminal trial in Tanzanian courts was a judge or Magistrate-dominated, lawyer-free procedure, which was conducted smoothly that plea bargaining was not allowed by the law.​[6]​ Thereafter, in the process of adhering to the spirit of adversary procedure and the consequences of increased crimes in Tanzania it injected vast complexity into the trial and made it unworkable as a routine dispositive procedure. A variety of factors compelled the criminal justice system in Tanzania to channel the mounting caseload into a non-trial plea bargaining procedure rather than to refine its trial procedure as a contemporary legal system.​[7]​

There has been reported an increase in crimes in Tanzania especially the economic crimes when compared to other African countries.​[8]​ According to the report, the Tanzanian organization continues to grapple with a relatively high prevalence of economic crimes, although faring better than its East Africa neighbours other than Rwanda. It is notable, however, that the government of Tanzania has continued to put in place mechanisms to ensure that this prevalence is suppressed in the future.​[9]​ In a bid to ensure timely delivery of justice, reduce the backlog of cases, as well as reducing inmate congestions in prison facilities, the government of Tanzania has issued a law that aims at, among other things to introduce plea-bargaining in criminal cases. The law was presented for the first reading in the National Assembly on 26th June 2019 and it was later passed into law in September 2019. However, the recent trend in plea bargaining in Tanzania has invited some questions which require further investigations on the law governing plea bargaining in Tanzania.

1.2 	Statement of the Problem
The Tanzania Criminal Justice has now accepted the fact that plea bargaining plays a significant role in the efficient administration of justice and has sustained it by embracing Bargaining policies that indirectly give effect to the agreements fashioned by the Tanzania criminal justice system.  There is still no formal process through which Tanzanian courts are required to scrutinize the contents of a plea bargain and to ensure that there is adequate protection for the rights and interests of all of the affected parties, the government, the accused, the victim(s) and members of society in general.  

The amended law which introduces plea bargaining requires a public prosecutor, after consultation with the victim or investigator where the circumstances so permit, may at any time before the judgment, enter a plea-bargaining arrangement with the accused and his advocate if represented.  Where the accused is represented, a relative, friend or any other person legally competent may represent the accused.​[10]​  The accused or his advocate or a public prosecutor may initiate a plea bargaining and notify the court of their intention to negotiate a plea agreement.​[11]​ The law prohibits the court to participate in plea negotiations between a public prosecutor and the accused.  However, the plea negotiation must obtain the written consent of the Director of Public Prosecution.​[12]​

It is a principle of law that for the bargaining negotiation to be fair, parties to the negotiation must be fair and of equal status.  However, it appears that most of the plea-bargaining negotiations currently conducted in Tanzania are mostly related to economic criminal offences.  The economic crime offences in Tanzania have no bail and thus, they conduct plea bargaining negotiation while in custody. From the accused, lack of a formal procedure requiring the disclosure of a plea bargain by counsel means that there is currently no independent review of whether they have entered into such an agreement voluntarily and with full knowledge of the potential ramifications.  

Furthermore, there is always the possibility that a failure by counsel to inform the court on the plea process and how a plea agreement has been reached will lead to a situation in which the accused duly fulfills his or her part of the bargain but does not ultimately receive a sentence that adequately reflects the expectations that have been fostered by the intended criminal justice.

Notably, a plea agreement is required to be registered by the court for it to be binding, and the Court will convict the accused person accordingly. Accordingly,  the Court is vested with powers to reject a plea agreement so long as there are adequate reasons to do so.​[13]​  However, there are no clear guidelines as to what constitutes adequate reasons.  Generally, Plea bargaining is said to be the most critical process in the criminal justice system. For the judicial process, without it the courts may become overwhelmed with criminal cases. Thus, it is important to have adequate law, which governs this matter. In the absence of clear and adequate laws, plea bargaining may not bring justice to the accused person.

1.3 	Literature Review
There is generally the existence of considerable literature on the area of plea-bargaining negotiations in the world.  However, there has been very limited literature written in Tanzania.  This study reviews some of the notable literature to identify the gap and provide justification for this study. According to Schuster ​[14]​ the United States has been implementing plea bargaining in the country for several hundred years. Overtime issues have resolved in terms of defendants’ rights and specifically that the defendant has the right to have a trial by a jury.  

He further states that those against the process of plea bargaining believe that criminals get away with breaking the law by allowing for lighter sentencing in exchange for a guilty plea.  Schuster suggests that those who commit violent crimes against another person should not have the opportunity for plea bargaining because if they had a jury trial of their peers the evidence could be shown and essentially sentenced according to the nature of the crime and generally have a longer or harsher sentence. Schuster has focused his findings based on the USA jurisprudence; this study focuses on plea bargaining with much focus on Tanzanian criminal justice jurisprudence. 

According to Henson,​[15]​ prompted by victims’ advocates, many jurisdictions have adopted consultation requirements, mandating that prosecutors seek input from victims before consummating deals with defendants. He further states that, the trial process when convicting a criminal could be a long-drawn-out process for the victim and their families. Some believe that it could go two ways for a victim; either it will help them heal or cause new wounds. For the criminal a plea bargain in my opinion is a way for the criminal to take responsibility for his actions and be held accountable with the maximum punishment. Henson describes the plea-bargaining concept base on the side of accused persons who have committed the said crime.  He did not consider those accused persons whose cases are merely malicious or prompted with political sentiments.  This study covers this gap. 

According to Bergman, ​[16]​ In-custody defendants who either do not have the right to bail or cannot afford bail may get out of jail immediately following the judge’s acceptance of a plea. Depending on the offense, the defendant may get out altogether or on probation, with or without some community service obligations. Otherwise, the defendant may have to serve more time, but will still get out much sooner than if the case had gone to trial.  He further states that defendants can reap from plea bargaining are that they can save a bundle on attorneys’ fees, assuming private counsel represents them. It almost always takes a lot more time and effort to try a case than to negotiate and handle a plea bargain, so defense counsel typically charges a much higher fee if the case goes to trial. The author portrays the benefit of plea bargaining to the accused person and he does not consider the victim's side that will require justice.  This study covers the gap as it intends to address the side of the injustice of plea bargaining with the specific focus of Tanzania.

The Team of Legal Writers and Editors of the Findlaw​[17]​ provides that the plea bargaining provides the opportunity for a more lenient sentence than if convicted at trial, and to have fewer (or less serious) offenses listed on a criminal record. There's also the natural tendency to want to trade risk for certainty. This is especially true if you're being represented by an overworked public defender with little time to devote to the case. Therein lays the source of frequent criticism of the plea-bargaining system. Some defendants, even if not guilty of the crime, will feel compelled to take the lighter sentence instead of asserting their constitutional right to a fair trial because they cannot afford a "top-shelf" legal defense. The author's submission suggests that there are much lenience and discretion to the prosecutor to decide the kind of punishment and accused person should have based on the negotiated entered.  This welcomes chances of malpractice and corruption to the part of the prosecution side.  This gap will be covered by the foregoing study. 

Heumann’s ​[18]​states that relatively few criminal cases in this country are resolved by full Perry Mason-style trials are fairly common knowledge. Most cases are settled by a guilty plea after some form of negotiation over the charge or sentence. But why? The standard explanation is case pressure: the enormous volume of criminal cases, to be processed with limited staff, time and resources. But a large body of new empirical research now demands that we re-examine plea negotiation. He further provides that plea bargaining strongly and explicitly attacks the case-pressure argument and suggests an alternative explanation for plea bargaining based on the adaptation of attorneys and judges to the local criminal court. The author of this study focuses on the fairness of the recently introduced plea bargaining concept in Tanzanian criminal justice.

1.4 	Objective of the Study
This study aims at examining the effectiveness of the legal and institutional frameworks governing Plea Bargaining Negotiations in Tanzania and suggests ways to a fair plea bargaining.

1.4.2 	Specific Objectives
(i)	 To evaluate laws governing plea bargaining in Tanzania;
(ii)	To analyze whether plea bargaining in Tanzania is real bargaining; and
(iii)	To suggest possible ways in which plea bargaining can be made fair to both parties.
1.5 	Research Questions
(i)	 Which laws govern plea-bargaining in Tanzania?
(ii)	 Is the existing plea-bargaining in Tanzania a real bargaining plea?
(iii)	iii Which ways can be employed to make plea bargaining fair to both parties?
1.6 	Research Significance
This research study is very beneficial to all persons involved in the prosecution of offences in Tanzania.  It shall serve all stakeholders in the prosecution of offences and the judiciary in Tanzania.  This research study is useful for academic purposes. It provides conceptual, theoretical knowledge in the area of plea bargaining in the prosecution of offences in Tanzania. It provides understanding and insight into the laws governing plea-bargaining in Tanzania. Also, the research study is the yardstick for further research. It is a stepping-stone upon the furtherance of research upon the fairness of plea-bargaining negotiations in the country since it is a new and growing court process. 
1.7 	Research Methodology
The study is doctrinal research as it undertakes to examine the laws and institutions, which govern the process of plea-bargaining negotiations in Tanzania. The study is conducted to identify the laws and institutions on the plea-bargaining negotiations in Tanzania. The study is concerned with the analytical review of the laws and institutions responsible for the plea-bargaining negotiations in trying to identify its fairness in the justice delivery process. 
The documentary review is used to examine and analyze the documents that contain information on the concept of plea-bargaining in general. The researcher used the documentary review method because it is cost-effective in the sense that data on plea-bargaining is globally available, inexpensively accessible and saves time. Also, the researcher used the method because of the non-reactivity of the documents and was useful in the problem formulation. This method assisted the researcher to understand what the legal and non-legal sources portray the process of plea-bargaining negotiations and its effectiveness. Furthermore, it enabled the researcher to know the chronological sequence of the functioning of the legal and institutional framework on the concept of plea bargaining in the prosecution process in Tanzania. 

Under the documentary review, the researcher ensured that the documents he consulted are genuine and authentic so as to have reliable and credible information for the purpose of the research. Accordingly, the researcher used documentary review to examine the primary legal sources such as principal legislation for instance the constitution of the United Republic of Tanzania of 1977 as amended, the URTC, 1977; the Penal Code Act, CAP. 16; the Criminal Procedure Act, R.E 2002; the Evidence Act, 2016 (Act No.9 of 2016) and the Written Laws (Miscellaneous Amendments) Act (No. 4) 2019 (Act No. 11 of 2019).

The researcher has used the documentary review method to examine the secondary legal sources such as textbooks by distinguished writers, journal articles, papers presented at various conferences, legal newspapers, comments and reviews by legal practitioners and academicians, organizations, independent researchers, officials or representatives of states so far as they were relevant to the concept of plea-bargaining especially on the criminal court process, case reports, digests and comments, teachings of the most highly qualified publicists and negotiating history Prosecution sector. In obtaining documents the researcher visited various libraries such as the Open University of Tanzania, Tanganyika Library in Dar es Salaam, USA Embassy Library at Dar es Salaam; Ministry of Internal Affairs Library at Dar es Salaam and High Court Registry of Tanzania at Dar es Salaam. 

To complement doctrinal method, the researcher used empirical method by using a purposive approach whereby the researcher visited various places such as Kisutu District and Resident courts, The Police Investigation Department at Oyster bay, Regional and Headquarter Police Offices in Dar es Salaam, The Regional Office of the Prevention and Combating of Corruption Bureau office, The Police College at Kurasini and the Regional Office of the Attorney General in Dar es Salaam.  The researcher applied the empirical method by focusing on a purposive approach, which allowed the use of interviews and discussion groups. The researcher used this method because it is useful to obtain information about personal and group perceptions and opinions, which are relevant to the plea-bargaining negotiation and its legal and institutional frameworks.​[19]​

The researcher used mostly a qualitative method to analyze the research findings obtained through documentary review and focus group discussion. It involved an analysis of the research findings according to the identified themes of the research. The research themes based on the effectiveness of the legal and institutional framework governing the plea-bargaining negotiations.

1.8 	Scope of the Study 
The study has focused mainly on laws and institutions governing plea-bargaining negotiations in Tanzania.  Since the concept of plea-bargaining negotiation is new in the criminal prosecution machinery, the study focuses on examining whether the available laws and institutions provide a fair environment to both parties in the negotiating process. The study has been conducted mainly in the prosecution machinery of Dar es Salaam Region.  The choice of Dar es Salaam was attracted by the most recent economic crimes and money laundering cases which have been settled by the Kisutu Resident Magistrate Court by using plea-bargaining Agreement.

1.9 	Limitation of the Study




AN OVERVIEW OF LAWS GOVERNING PLEA- BARGAINING

2.1 	Introduction
The goal of modern criminal and criminal procedure legislation of most countries is not only the restoration of justice by punishing the individuals responsible for the crimes, but also the development of measures aimed at the attainment of fair criminal justice. An examination of the plea-bargaining procedure in the eyes of the legislative legislation is an important step to establish the fairness of the process.  This chapter focuses on an overview of the legislative measures governing plea-bargaining negotiations in Tanzania.

2.2 	Plea Bargaining Under the  Constitution of the United Republic of Tanzania  1977
Plea bargaining has been defined in the law to mean an arrangement between a prosecutor and accused whereby the accused pleads guilty to a particular offence or a lesser charge in exchange for a more lenient sentence or an agreement to drop other charges.​[20]​ In other words, it is a voluntary exchange that leaves both parties better off, in that defendants have many procedural and substantive rights, including a right to trial and to appeal a guilty verdict. By pleading guilty, defendants waive those rights in exchange for a commitment from the prosecutor, such as a reduced charge or more favorable sentence. The Constitution of the United Republic of Tanzania provides a safe environment for plea bargaining to smoothly operate in Tanzanian courts.
The Constitution of Tanzania,​[21]​ as amended, sets out the country’s founding values and principles in its preamble and other provisions.  For the concept of plea bargaining, the preamble calls upon building a country founded on principles of freedom, justice, fraternity, and concord. Such principles could be realized through a built democratic society in which the Executive is accountable to a Legislature composed of elected members and representative of the people, and also a Judiciary which is independent and dispenses justice without fear or favour, thereby ensuring that all human rights are preserved and protected and that the duties of every person are faithfully discharged. To achieve the above principles, the named organs of the state must work hand in hand through checks and balance concept. The government through its prosecution machinery is expected to adopt a process that will enhance justice through speedy trials in courts.

The Constitution further provides for the welfare of the general public is a basic objective of the government.​[22]​ The Constitution cites the promotion of the general welfare as a primary objective of the government. Promotion of the general welfare compels the governing body to enact laws to promote the general welfare of the people, sometimes worded as the public welfare.​[23]​ To 'promote the general welfare' means to do what is best for the citizens of the country, for the government to protect and ensure the welfare of its citizen are preserved and promoted. Legislations on Plea bargaining allows defense attorneys to increase their efficiency and profits because they can invest less time on plea-bargained cases. Disposing of cases efficiently is important for both public and private attorneys.  With so doing the welfare of the people in the society is promoted. The welfare of the people is promoted when plea bargaining assists the court and the state in enabling speed trial whereby minimizing the chronic problem in the judiciary regarding case-loads. Also, the process decreases the prosecutors’ workload by letting them prepare for more serious cases by leaving effortless and petty charges to settle through.

Accordingly, the constitution provides that the object of this Constitution is to facilitate the building of the United Republic as a nation of equal and free individuals enjoying freedom, justice, fraternity, and concord, through the pursuit of the policy of Socialism and Self Reliance which emphasizes the application of socialist principles while taking into account the conditions prevailing in the United Republic.​[24]​ Therefore, the state authority and all its agencies are obliged to direct their policies and programmes towards ensuring that human dignity and other human rights are respected and cherished; that all forms of injustice, intimidation, discrimination, corruption, oppression or favouritism are eradicated.​[25]​

The promotion and preservation of human dignity is the key objective of all international instruments on human rights.  While there are many cases pending trial in Tanzanian courts, prisons are as well overcrowded.  Laws of plea bargaining allows judges and magistrates to minimize the number of cases pending trial in courts.  Since judges are also aware of overcrowding in jails, so they might be receptive to process out offenders who are unlikely to do much jail time anyway. This means cases will be closed much quicker, which is good for the society as the method for removing case congestion and court systems left for more serious cases.

The Constitution provides that all human beings are born free, and are all equal​[26]​ and are all entitled without any discrimination, to protection and equality before the law.​[27]​ Equality before the law, also known as equality under the law, equality in the eyes of the law, legal equality, or legal egalitarianism, is the principle that each independent being must be treated equally by the law and that all are subject to the same laws of justice (due process (​https:​/​​/​en.wikipedia.org​/​wiki​/​Due_process" \o "Due process​)).​[28]​ Therefore, the law must guarantee that neither individual nor group of individuals be privileged or discriminated against by the government. Equality before the law is one of the basic principles of liberalism (​https:​/​​/​en.wikipedia.org​/​wiki​/​Liberalism​).​[29]​





The Constitution is clear on discrimination before the law as it provides that no person shall be discriminated against by any person or any authority acting under any law or in the discharge of the functions or business of any state office.​[31]​ The expression “discriminate” means to satisfy the needs, rights or other requirements of different persons based on their nationality, tribe, place of origin, political opinion, colour, religion, sex or station in life. Such that certain categories of people are regarded as weak or inferior and are subjected to restrictions or conditions whereas persons of other categories are treated differently or are accorded opportunities or advantage outside the specified conditions or the prescribed necessary qualifications except that the word “discrimination” shall not be construed in a manner that will prohibit the Government from taking purposeful steps aimed at rectifying disabilities in the society.​[32]​

The Constitution provides a clear procedure for persons who have violated the law in promoting equality and eliminating discrimination in society. To ensure equality before the law, the state authority shall make procedures which are appropriate or which take into account the following principles, namely: (a) when the rights and duties of any person are being determined by the court or any other agency, that person shall be entitled to a fair hearing and to the right of appeal or another legal remedy against the decision of the court or of the other agency concerned; (b) no person charged with a criminal offence shall be treated as guilty of the offence until proved guilty of that offence; (d) to preserve the right or equality of human beings, human dignity shall be protected in all activities about criminal investigations and process, and in any other matters for which a person is restrained, or in the execution of a sentence.​[33]​

The Constitution provides that every person has the right to live and to the protection of his life by the society per the law.​[34]​ Plea bargaining negotiations allows eliminating case uncertainty from the criminal defense’s perspective. It helps defendants with making sure they will not receive more serious charges for the criminal acts filed against them. In so doing it encourages the court not to give a maximum sentence for their crimes due to their good participation in investigation and criminal proceedings without disturbing the court.

The Constitution guarantees every person the right to freedom and to live as a free person.​[35]​When a charged individual takes a plea bargain, he will not have to go through a trial. This means that some crimes, which may have been committed, and any damning evidence are not going to be discovered.  This suggests that with the absence of trial the accused is likely to be given a lesser punishment, which will give him freedom as opposed to stiff punishment he could have received. Plea bargaining provides considerable freedom of the accused person to negotiate with his prosecutor to allow quick justice to the accused and the state. The accused are given this freedom because the right to freedom is fundamentally essential for the development of the personality of every individual and in the preservation of human dignity. 

The Constitution guarantees the respect and protection of his person, the privacy of his person, his family and of his matrimonial life, and respect and protection of his residence and private communications.​[36]​Plea bargaining is an agreement concluded between the prosecutor and the defendant through working together to agree with each other, instead of taking the litigation to court. It often includes things like pleading to a lesser charge and pleading guilty in exchange for a lighter sentence.  This undertaking provides the accused with personal privacy, individual personality and hence family protection.  It is obvious that the prosecution of cases in open court may bring embarrassment, annoyance, lowering the accused reputation in the society and sometimes separating the family.

The Constitution guarantees every citizen of the United Republic has the right to freedom of movement in the United Republic and the right to live in any part of the United Republic, to leave and enter the country, and the right not to be forced to leave or be expelled from the United Republic.​[37]​In a plea bargaining agreement, prosecutors will often roll other conditions for the defendants to testify against a co-defendant, which might help solve larger cases in a prosecution.  This helps accused persons who have serious cases especially those who dodo not allow bail to be free depending on the kind of agreement they have reached.

Generally, The Constitution guarantees various rights to all citizens.  These rights originate from the international commitment Tanzania has entered to promote and safeguard the dignity of her people.  The right to equality before the law, absence of discrimination, elimination of all forms of injustice and various freedoms, are the cornerstone of the introduction of plea-bargaining laws in Tanzania

2.3 	Plea Bargaining Under the Penal Code Act, Cap. 16, R.E 2002
A Penal Code Act is a body of law dealing with various crimes or offenses and their legal penalties in Tanzania.​[38]​  This is the established code of criminal law that repealed the Indian Penal Code of 1872.  This is the code addressing areas of penal law involving offenses against persons, property and the state and punishment thereto.  Plea-bargaining may generally be conducted in every offence provided in the Penal Code with exceptional specifically to those offences mentioned under the Criminal Procedure Act.​[39]​ To make it clear, the researcher has attempted to review some offences in the penal code which plea bargaining agreement may be applied.

The penal code prohibits Unlawful Assemblies and Riots and Other Offences against public tranquility.​[40]​  When three or more persons assemble with intent to commit an offence, or, being assembled with intent to carry out some common purpose, conduct themselves in such a manner as to cause persons in the neighborhood reasonably to fear that the persons so assembled will commit a breach of the peace, or will by such assembly needlessly and without any reasonable occasion provoke other persons to commit a breach of the peace, they are an unlawful assembly.
The code provides further that, it is immaterial that the original assembling was lawful if, being assembled; they conduct themselves with a common purpose in such manner as aforesaid.  When an unlawful assembly has begun to execute the purpose for which it assembled by a breach of the peace and to the terror of the public, the assembly is called a riot, and the persons assembled are said to be riotously assembled.  Plea-bargaining can be applied to this offence. On the other side, the accused person on the above offence may plead provocation as a defense to the said offence.  That, they unlawfully gathered in the street to hunt a thief who has been disturbing their peace and property for a very long time.  

Furthermore, the penal code prohibits the administration of unlawful authority.​[41]​ It provides that, any person who, being employed in the public service, and being charged by his employment with any judicial or administrative duties respecting the property of special character, or respecting the carrying on of any manufacture, trade or business or a special character, and having acquired or holding, directly or indirectly, private interest in any such property, manufacture, trade or business, discharges any such duties for the property, manufacture, trade, or business in which he has such interest or concerning the conduct of any person in relation thereto, is guilty of a misdemeanour, and is liable to imprisonment for one year.  A Plea-bargaining negotiation can be applied to this offence.

It might be that such a person so charged in the offence above was mistakenly charged in resemblance of the other employee.  A carefully pleaded defense of mistake of fact could be applied on the other hand to settle down this offense.  
The penal code prohibits any offences relating to a certain religion.​[42]​ It provides that, any person who destroys, damages or defiles any place of insult to worship or any object which is held sacred by any class of persons to thereby insult the religion of any class of any as persons or with the knowledge that any class of persons is likely to consider such destruction, damage or defilement as an insult to their religion, is guilty of a misdemeanor.  Any person, who voluntarily causes disturbance to any assembly lawfully engaged in the performance of religious worship or religious ceremony, is guilty of a misdemeanour.  Offences relating to a certain religion can be settled through plea bargaining negotiations as provided in the criminal procedure Act.  However, such offences may also be settled by pleading provocation, but these defenses to win it requires a good presentation of facts on that defense.

The penal code prohibits​[43]​theft.  The code provides that, every inanimate thing whatever that is the property of any person, and which is movable, is capable of being stolen. Every inanimate thing which is the property of any person, and which is capable of being made movable, is capable of being stolen as soon as it becomes movable, although it is made movable to steal it.  Every tame animal, whether tame by nature or wild by nature and tamed, which is the property of any person, is capable of being stolen.  The code further provides that, a person who fraudulently and without a claim of right takes anything capable of being stolen, or fraudulently converts to the use of any person other than the general or special owner thereof anything capable of being stolen, is said to steal that thing.​[44]​ The offences of theft as mentioned above can be settled through a plea bargaining agreement concluded between the accused person and the prosecutor.  However, intoxication may be another way to settle this offence, once pleaded well.

The Parliament of Tanzania has made amendments to several Criminal Laws in Tanzania, among others, to introduce the Plea Bargain. Some of the amendments made included the Amendment of the Criminal Procedure Act, (Cap. 20), Amendment of the Extradition Act, (Cap. 368), Amendment of the National Prosecutions Service Act, (Cap.430), Amendment of the Prevention And Combating of Corruption Act, (Cap. 329), Amendment of the Proceeds of Crimes Act (Cap. 256). Further, additional amendments have been done to other laws including Amendment of the Advocates Act, (Cap. 341), Amendment of the Office of the Attorney General (Discharge of Duties) Act, (Cap. 268), Amendment of the Government Proceedings Act, (Cap. 5), Amendment of the Magistrates’ Courts Act, (Cap. 11), Amendment of the Births and Deaths Registration Act, (Cap. 108). 

In such an amendment, the Penal Code Act was not amended.  This suggests that judges and magistrates shall be guided by the provisions of section 194F of the CPA, which gives a list of few offences not applicable to plea bargaining.

2.4 	Plea Bargaining Under the Criminal Procedure Act, Cap 20, R.E 2002
The Criminal Procedure Act is an Act to provide for the procedure to be followed in the investigation of crimes and the conduct of criminal trials and for other related purposes. The Act was passed in 1985 by the parliament and came into force by the Government Notice No. 375.​[45]​  The Act provided for procedures of all offences under the Penal Code shall be inquired into, tried and otherwise dealt with according to the provisions of this Act. All offences under any other law shall be inquired into, tried and otherwise dealt with according to the provisions of this Act, except where that other law provides differently for the regulation of the manner or place of the investigation into, trial or dealing in any other way with those offences.

The second part of the Criminal Procedure Act provides for proceedings relating to criminal investigations in Tanzania.  All procedures of arrest, escape and recapture, search warrants and seizure are provided in this part.  The Act provides for Powers and Duties of Police Officers when Investigating, Duration of Custodial Investigation by Police Offences in this part.  This part of the Act provides also the Duties when Interviewing Suspects; Recording of Interview and Other Investigative Actions.

The Third Part of the Criminal Procedure Act provides for Prevention of Offences such as the Director of Public Prosecution while the Control of Criminal Proceedings has been provided in part Four of this Act.  The institution of proceedings such as Process to Compel the Appearance of accused persons, among others, has been provided under Part five of this Act.  The general provisions relating to trials have been provided under part six of the CPA while procedure in trials before subordinate courts have been provided under part seven of the CPA.  The procedure in trials before the High Court has been provided under part eight of the Act.  Part nine of the CPA provides for conviction, judgment, sentences and execution in the subordinate courts and the high court while appeals serve for part ten.  Supplementary provisions form part eleven of this Act.
The Criminal Procedure Act, Cap. 20 were recently amended in section 3 whereby “plea agreement” was added to mean an agreement entered into between the prosecution and the accused in a criminal trial.​[46]​  Meanwhile, “plea bargaining” was added to mean a negotiation in a criminal case between a prosecutor and the accused whereby the accused agrees to- (a) plead guilty to a particular offence or a lesser offence or a particular count or counts in a charge with multiple counts; or (b) cooperate with the prosecutor in the provision of information that may lead to a discovery of other information relating to the offence or count charged, in return for a concession from the prosecutor which may lead to a lenient sentence or withdrawal of other counts.​[47]​
It could now be summarized that, in response to the introduction of the plea-bargaining negotiations in Tanzania courts, the Criminal Procedure Act was amended to introduce the word plea bargaining in the Act.   Plea bargaining has been defined by the Act to mean: a negotiation in a criminal case between a prosecutor and the accused whereby the accused agrees to- Plead guilty to a particular offence or a lesser offence or a particular count or counts in a charge with multiple counts; or cooperate with the prosecutor in the provision of information that may lead to a discovery of other information relating to the offence or count charged, in return for concession from the prosecutor which may lead to a lenient sentence or withdrawal of other counts.​[48]​
The amendment​[49]​ has further defined plea agreement to means an agreement entered into between the prosecution and the accused in a criminal trial per sections 194A, 194B and 194C.​[50]​ The words Plea bargaining and Plea agreement were not present in the Criminal Procedure Act before this amendment.  To make the provisions for plea bargaining negotiations to be complete in the Act a number of sections have been made in the Act.

The amendment also provides for please bargaining procedure.  The law provides that, a public prosecutor, after consultation with the victim or investigator where the circumstances so permit, may at any time before the judgment, enter a plea bargaining arrangement with the accused and his advocate if represented or, if not represented, a relative, friend or any other person legally competent to represent the accused.​[51]​  (2) The accused or his advocate or a public prosecutor may initiate a plea bargaining and notify the court of their intention to negotiate a plea agreement.  (3) Negotiations between a public prosecutor and the accused. (4) Where prosecution is undertaken privately, no plea agreement shall be concluded without the written consent of the Director of Public Prosecutions.​[52]​

Concerning consequences of plea bargaining section 194 ​[53]​  provides that, where consequent to a plea bargaining arrangement, a plea agreement is entered into between a public prosecutor and an accused person- (a) the public prosecutor may charge the accused with a lesser offence, withdraw other counts or take any other measure as appropriate depending on the circumstances of the case; (b) the accused may enter a plea of guilty to the offence charged or to a lesser offence or to a particular count or counts in a charge with multiple counts in exchange for a withdrawal of other counts; or (c) the accused may be ordered to pay compensation or make restitution or be subjected to forfeiture of the proceeds and instrumentalities that were used to commit the crime in question.​[54]​

Plea bargaining is said to have disregarded other aspects of the criminal justice system such as the due process of the law which envisages a right to a full trial. This may be termed as due process considerations. If one agrees to plea bargaining, he forfeits some of his constitutional rights especially the right to a full trial. Other rights that are undercut as listed in the criminal procedure code and the Constitution of the United Republic of Tanzania​[55]​ are the presumption of innocence, examination of witnesses and right to remain silent. This does not provide procedural fairness to the accused.

Besides, the law also provides for the requirement of plea bargaining. The law requires a plea agreement to be in writing witnessed by the advocate of the accused or, if not represented, a relative, friend or any other person legally competent to represent the accused.​[56]​ Where an accused person has negotiated with a prosecutor through an interpreter, the interpreter shall certify that he is proficient in that language and that he interpreted accurately during the negotiations and in respect of the contents of the agreement.  He further provided that, no plea agreement shall be entered between a prosecutor and accused, without the prior written consent of the Director of Public Prosecutions or any other officer authorizes it in writing.​[57]​

A police officer in charge of a police station or a court before whom an accused person is brought or appears, shall not admit that person to bail if– (a) that person is charged with– murder, treason, armed robbery, or defilement; illicit trafficking in drugs against the Drugs and Prevention of Illicit Traffic in Drugs Act, but does not include a person charged for an offence of having drugs which taking into account all circumstances in which the offence was committed, was not meant for the conveyance or commercial purpose; an offence involving heroin, cocaine, prepared opium, opium poppy (papaver setigerum), poppy straw, coca plant, coca leaves, cannabis sativa or cannabis resin (Indian hemp), methaqualone (mandrax), catha edulis (khat) or any other narcotic drug or psychotropic substance specified in the Schedule to this Act which has an established value certified by the Commissioner for National Coordination of Drugs Control Commission, as exceeding ten million shillings.​[58]​

The Act further provides that, an accused person on the offence of terrorism against the Prevention of Terrorism Act, 2002; money laundering contrary to Anti-money Laundering Act, 2006 or it appears that the accused person has previously been sentenced to imprisonment for a term exceeding three years; (c) it appears that the accused person has previously been granted bail by a court and failed to comply with the conditions of the bail or absconded; (d) it appears to the court that the accused person must be kept in custody for his protection or safety; (e) the offence with which the person is charged involves actual money or property whose value exceeds ten million shillings unless that person deposits cash or other property equivalent to half the amount or value of actual money or property involved and the rest is secured by the execution of a bond, shall not be given bail.​[59]​Provided that where the property to be deposited is immovable, it shall be sufficient to deposit the title deed, or if the title deed is not available such other evidence as is satisfactory to the court in proof of the existence of the property; save that this provision shall not apply in the case of police bail.

Concerning registration of plea as the law requires any plea agreement entered into under the provisions of sections 194A and 194B to be registered by the court.​[60]​  The court shall, before it registers any such agreement, satisfy itself that the agreement was voluntarily obtained and the accused was competent to enter into such agreement. The court may pronounce a decision based on plea agreement or make such other orders as it deems necessary including an order to reject the plea agreement for sufficient reasons, except that, such rejection shall not operate as a bar to any subsequent negotiations preferred by the parties. ​[61]​Where the court accepts a plea agreement- (a) the agreement shall become binding upon the prosecution side and the accused, and (b) the agreement shall become part of the record of the court. (5) Where a plea agreement entered into per sections 194A and the court accepts 194B, the court shall proceed to convict an accused person accordingly.​[62]​

A new additional provision, 194F regarding registration of plea bargaining has been added to section 194 of the Criminal Procedure Act. The provision provides offences which plea bargaining shall not apply, namely:  (a) sexual offences whose punishment exceeds five years or involving victims under eighteen years; (b) treason and treasonable offences; (c) possession or trafficking in narcotic drugs whose market value is above twenty million shillings; (d) terrorism; (e) possession of Government trophy whose value is above twenty million shillings without the consent, in writing, of the Director of Public Prosecutions;​[63]​

The amended Act provides for the procedure to be used when registering a plea bargaining agreement. Before the court records a plea, the accused shall be placed under oath; and the court shall address the accused person in court in a language he understands and shall inform him of his rights and that, by accepting a plea agreement, he is waiving his right to a full trial; by entering into a plea agreement, he is waiving the right to appeal except as to the extent or legality of a sentence; and the prosecution has the right, in the case of prosecution for perjury or false statement, to use any statement that he gives in the agreement against him.   

A careful examination of the deliverance of justice has to be undertaken in the future because; denying a right to appeal to an individual is equal to denial to justice.  Laws of plea bargaining give the accused person an environment of equality before the law as opposed to being seen the wrong person in the society and hence discriminated against. Plea bargains are a significant factor in restructuring offenders by letting them agree to the blame for their trial and by letting them voluntarily submit before the law without having expensive and time-consuming trials.​[64]​The Constitution is clear on discrimination before the law as it provides that no person shall be discriminated against by any person or any authority acting under any law or in the discharge of the functions or business of any state office.​[65]​ The expression “discriminate” means to satisfy the needs, rights or other requirements of different persons based on their nationality, tribe, place of origin, political opinion, colour, religion, sex or station in life. The above newly established law has empowered the Chief Justice in Tanzania to make rules and give directives for better carrying out the provisions of the amended provisions of the Criminal Procedure Act. 

A new additional provision, 194G regarding registration of plea bargaining has been added to section 194 of the Criminal Procedure Act. The provision empowers the DPP to set aside all matters relating to plea bargaining and in the public interest and the orderly administration of justice, apply to the court which passed the sentence to have the conviction and sentence procured on the grounds of fraud or misrepresentation according to a plea agreement.​[66]​ The provision empowers also an accused person who is a party to a plea agreement may apply to the court which passed the sentence to have the conviction and sentence procured involuntarily or by misrepresentation according to a plea agreement is set aside.​[67]​ With this regard, the judge has little information about the offence or the defendant and can therefore not evaluate the prosecutor’s appraisal of each. The effect of this may be the giving of sentences that do not reflect either the seriousness of the offence or the objectives of punishment. This makes the work of the judge easier at the expense of the accused and the general public. This is said to be a tactical consideration and inherent bias in the legal system.

2.5 	Plea Bargaining Under the Government Proceedings Act, Cap 5
The Government Proceedings Act was passed in 1975 and made into force with the GN no. 308 of 1975.  It is an Act to provide for the rights and liabilities of the Government in civil matters, for the procedure in civil proceedings by or against the Government and for related matters.  The Act provides for substantive laws such as Liability of Government in civil proceedings in the second part of this Act while jurisdiction and procedure such as civil proceedings against Government, have been provided under part three of the Act.  Executions by the Government have been secured into part four of the Act. 

Plea bargains allow a criminal case to be settled out of court, usually well in advance of a trial. A plea deal allows a defendant to plead guilty to one or more criminal counts in exchange for a reduction in charges or sentences. Most criminal cases are ultimately resolved with the assistance of a plea bargain arrangement. The government has created the office of the Solicitor General to assist the smooth transaction of cases in courts.​[68]​
The decision of whether to accept a plea bargain or not depends on the nature of the charge, the strength of the prosecution’s evidence and the likelihood that a judge or jury will render a guilty verdict in the case. This is important to the office of the Attorney General and the Solicitor general to work together to make sure that cases are cleared smoothly and quickly if the need so demands.  The Attorney General is required through the Solicitor General, has the right to intervene in any suit or matter instituted by or against the ministries, local government authorities, independent departments and other government institutions.​[69]​

Where the Attorney General intervenes in any matter in pursuance of subsection (1), the provisions of the Government Proceedings Act shall apply concerning the proceedings of that suit or matter as if it had been instituted by or against the ministries, local government authorities, independent departments, and other government institutions: Provided that, the requirement of ninety days-notice of intention to sue the Government as stipulated under the Government Proceedings Act shall not apply where the Attorney General intervenes under this section. Notwithstanding the provisions of any written law, a ministry, local government authority, independent department or other government institution shall have a duty to notify the Attorney General of any impending suit or intention to institute a suit or matter against the Authority.​[70]​

2.6 	Plea Bargaining Under the Evidence Act, Cap. 6 R.E 2002
The Evidence Act of 1967 was enacted in April 1967 by the parliament and came into force immediately after the minister issued the notice in the National Gazette.  The Act applies to all judicial proceedings in Tanzania in or before the High Court and all magistrates' courts.  The Act defines evidence to mean means by which any alleged matter of fact, the truth of which is submitted to investigation, is proved or disproved; and without prejudice to the foregoing generality, includes statements by accused persons, admissions and observations by the court in its judicial capacity.​[71]​

The Act Comprises of preliminary provisions such as application, interpretation, presumptions in chapter one while the relevancy of facts has been covered under chapter two of the Act.  This chapter comprises of admissions, admission, confession, statements by persons who cannot be called as a witness, a statement under special circumstances, the extent to which statement is to be proved, the relevancy of judgment, the relevance of opinion of third persons and relevancy of character.  

The Act comprises of a chapter on a proof.  This includes facts requiring proof, oral evidence, bankers’ book, public documents and presumption as to documents.  The Act is comprised of a chapter on the production and effect of evidence, which includes the burden of proof and estoppel.  A chapter on the witness is also included in the evidence Act.  It comprises of competency, compellable and privilege of a witness, the examination of witnesses, questioning of witnesses, refreshing memory and production of documents and questions by assessors.  A chapter on improper admission and rejection of evidence is also included in the Act.
There are rules and legal principles that govern the proof of facts in a legal proceeding. These rules determine what evidence must or must not be considered by the person in the use of such evidence (​https:​/​​/​en.wikipedia.org​/​wiki​/​Trier_of_fact" \o "Trier of fact​) in reaching its decision.  When a dispute, whether relating to a civil or criminal matter, reaches the court there will always be several issues that one party will have to prove to persuade the court to find in his or her favour. The law must ensure certain guidelines are set out to ensure that evidence presented to the court can be regarded as genuine.  The Evidence Act of Tanzania governs rules of evidence in legal proceedings in Tanzania. 

Although the law of evidence is very important in the legal proceedings, it was not included in the amendment of laws that introduced plea bargaining in legal proceedings in Tanzania.​[72]​ The absence of application of rules of evidence in a legal proceeding may result in injustice to the accused and the victim especially of cases that are fueled by politics or any other emotions. Since the judge or magistrate is not required by law to engage in plea bargaining negotiations, rules of evidence may not necessarily be applied. Judge and magistrate are not bound by the bargaining agreement in such they may reject to accept the registration of the plea-bargaining agreement in court.  This is because judges may recommend a case, which has reached a plea bargaining agreement to go through trial if he feels like plea bargaining was offered in bad faith.  Insufficient evidence usually results in dismissal of the case after the prosecution or the plaintiff has completed his/her introduction of evidence or, if, on appeal, the reversal of the judgment by the trial court may be considered.​[73]​
Evidence can be described as the material placed before a Court to assist a Judge or Magistrate to decide the matter. A Judge or Magistrate’s decision is limited to the evidence placed before them; therefore, a party must provide as much relevant evidence as possible to support their case.  Since plea bargaining negotiation allows neglect of rules of evidence in a legal proceeding, it is likely to have impact to the parties and justice in general.

2.7 	Conclusion
One of the big and crucial steps that Tanzania has archived in criminal system is to formalize plea bargaining as a possible process during criminal proceedings. It is an alternative, apart from the solid and common criminal litigation process embraced by our courts for a long time now.  The above discussion has presented that the Constitution of the United Republic of Tanzania of 1977 calls upon the government through its prosecution machinery to adopt a process that will enhance justice through speedy trials in courts.​[74]​ 







INSTITUTION GOVERNING PLEA-BARGAINING NEGOTIATIONS IN TANZANIA

3.1 	Introduction
For a person to achieve justice in any country, proper laws and procedures are very important in achieving fair and proper justice to a person. Fair and proper justice it is not only to the person who claimed to be offended but also to the offender himself/herself, by means of giving proper and fair decision, and fair procedure during the trial sessions.  One such measure it the institutions which deals with justice, which determines the possibility of obtaining lesser sentences by suspects or accused ones than prescribed by law, as the result of cooperation with the prosecution or the court.  This chapter discusses on the institutions governing plea bargaining negotiations in Tanzania.

3.2 	Police as an Institution for Implementation of Plea Bargaining
The police force in Tanzania is under the civilian control of the Ministry of Home Affairs regarded as part of the civil service. It is subject largely to the same control and disciplinary mechanisms as the civil service.  Organizationally, the Criminal Investigation Department, usually known by its acronym, C.I.D., and "Interpol," the international crime fighting/investigating department organized with the help of the British Commonwealth, are also under the Ministry of Home Affairs. The Ministry of Home Affairs also controls the Fire Brigade Department and the Directorate of Immigration.​[76]​
The police have myriad powers under the law. These include the powers of arrest, search, restraint and the power to investigate the commission of the rime. In Tanzania, the law, which vests these powers on the police, is the Criminal Procedure Act.​[77]​ While investigating crimes, the police are empowered under the Act to proceed to any place where they have reasonable suspicion that a crime has been committed, and then to conduct investigations. If the commission of an offense is detected, the police have th power to arrest suspects. However, the police have no power to arrest without a warrant unless the offense is one of the scheduled offenses provided under the Penal Code Act.​[78]​ The scheduled offenses are usually the grave ones like murder and treason, and those which relate to or are imminently involved in a breach of the peace. 

Police powers to arrest with a warrant are provided for under the Criminal Procedure Act.​[79]​ Under this provision, magistrates/ judges, ward secretaries and village secretaries have the ower to issue warrants for the arrest of persons suspected of having committed a crime. An arrest warrant is issued only under oath taken by the person who claims that an offense has been committed, and there must be reasonable grounds for issuing the warrant.​[80]​ An arrest warrant would only be issued if the suspect is not already under lawful custody. The warrant has to be accompanied by an order that the suspect is brought before a court of law, to be dealt with per the law.​[81]​

The goal and the pthe rincipal objective of any criminal justice system is the effective and efficient delivery of justice. The Administration of the Police and Prosecution, central players, in the justice delivery system must be guided by the cardinal maxim that justice must be manifestly seen to be done at all times. Since plea bargaining refers to negotiation in a criminal case between a prosecutor and the accused person, the institution of police plays a significant role in public prosecution of criminal offences in Tanzania.  A public prosecutor is any person appointed under the National Prosecutions Service Act​[82]​ and includes the Director of Public Prosecutions, the Attorney General, the Deputy Attorney General, a Parliamentary Draftsman, a State Attorney and any other person acting in criminal proceedings under the directions of the Director of Public Prosecutions.​[83]​

For the process of prosecution of suspects to function effectively and because of the paucity of state attorneys the Director of Public Prosecutions has been vested with powers to appoint public prosecutors for Tanzania generally or for any specified area of Tanzania or any specified category of cases.​[84]​  It is in the exercise of these powers that the Director of Public Prosecutions has appointed every police officer not below the rank of Assistant Inspector of Police to be a Public Prosecutor.​[85]​  In exercise of the same powers referred to above the Director of Public Prosecutions has appointed various other public officers to be Public Prosecutors. As such Labour Officers, Health Inspectors, Postal officials and other public officers prosecute cases related to their occupations.​[86]​

Public Prosecutors so appointed however remain subject to the directions of the Director of Public Prosecutions in the conduct of the prosecution. In Tanzania there is room for a private person to conduct a private prosecution provided he/she seeks and obtains leave from the magistrate inquiring into the case. The private prosecutor may after obtaining such leave conduct the prosecution in person or by an advocate. A private prosecutor may also withdraw from the conduct of prosecution so begun. It must be noted however that a private prosecution so instituted may be taken over or discontinued by the Director of Public Prosecutions as we saw earlier. It is clear therefore that the right of a private person to maintain the conduct of prosecution is not absolute.​[87]​

It is also worthy of note in this context that the powers of appointment of Public Prosecutors by the Director of Public Prosecutions are exercised more in general terms than in specificity. Except in rare cases where specifically named persons are appointed Public Prosecutors such appointment is more likely than not to take the form of holders of named offices, or ranks as is the case of appointment of all Police officers holding the rank of Assistant Inspector and above to be Public Prosecutors. While the Director of Public Prosecutions may insist based on the law that only Police officers of the appropriate rank act as Public Prosecutors, the decision as to who becomes promoted to that rank is not that of the Director of Public Prosecutions but that of the Police Force, the agency which employs the public prosecutor.

This is not a position unique to the Police agency; it is also true for other government departments where the appointment of Prosecutors is done in generic terms rather than sspecificallynamed persons. Need we point out here, however, that generic appointment has the convenience of perpetuity when compared to the appointment of named individuals. A balance may have to be struck between the perceived advantage and certainty.​[88]​

A Regional Crime Officer and District officer in charge of Criminal Investigation respectively supervises the criminal investigation units, answerable of course to the Regional Police Commander. Public Prosecutors in the police force fall under the general supervision of Regional Crime Officers, the principal supervisors of crime investigation at rthe egional level. They are however expected to co-ordinate their work with other officers such as officers in charge of Police Stations where the cases submitted to them for prosecution originates directly from police stations as in the case of offences triable in summary proceedings by Subordinate Courts.​[89]​

Investigators from the General Duties Branch i.e. uniformed officers normally investigate minor offences. Detectives from CID units investigate serious offences. While the coordination of the investigation into minor offences where such need arises will be the responsibility of the officers in charge of stations, CID units will do protracted investigations requiring the meticulous collection of evidence.  It is thus not uncommon for cases begun by the uniformed branch to be transferred to detectives in the CID units.​[90]​
One of the terms of the mandate of the Director of Criminal Investigation in the exercise of his/her discretion is to take over the investigation of any crime weredeemed expedient to do so. The Director of Criminal Investigation will in befitting cases instruct Regional Crime Officers to act in that regard. This perhaps ties up the equation. With the Public Prosecutor and the investigator both falling under the supervision of the Regional Crime Officer, we may conclude that it is his/her duty to co-ordinate both the process of investigation and the conduct of the prosecution.​[91]​

3.3 	Courts as Institutions for Implementation of Plea Bargaining
The judiciary is formed by the various courts of judicature and is independent of the government.  The Constitutional makes provision for the establishment of an independent judiciary, and the respect for the principles of the rule of law, human rights and good governance.  The Judiciary in Tanzania has four tiers: The Court of Appeal of the United Republic of Tanzania, the High Courts for Mainland Tanzania and Tanzania Zanzibar, Magistrates Courts, which are at two levels, i.e. the Resident Magistrate Courts and the District Court, both of which have concurrent jurisdiction. Primary Courts are the lowest in the judicial hierarchy.

The Court of Appeal of Tanzania, established under the URT Constitution, is the highest  in the hierarchy of judiciary in Tanzania.​[92]​ It consists of the Chief Justice and other Justices of Appeal. The Court of Appeal of Tanzania is the court of final appeal at the apex of the judiciary in Tanzania.  The High Court of Tanzania (for mainland Tanzania) and the High Court of Zanzibar are courts of unlimited original jurisdiction, and appeals therefrom going to the Court of Appeal.

The High Court of Tanzania was established under the URT Constitution and it has unlimited original jurisdiction to entertain all types of cases.​[93]​ The High Courts, exercise original jurisdiction on matters of a constitutional nature and have powers to entertain election petitions. The High Court’s Main Registry, (which includes the sub-Registries) caters for all civil and criminal matters. The High Court (mainland Tanzania) has established 10 sub Registries in a different zone of the country. It also has two specialized divisions, the Commercial Division and the Land Division. All appeals from subordinate courts go to the High Court of Tanzania.

Subordinate courts in Tanzania are another category of courts, which include the Resident Magistrate Courts, and the District Courts, which both enjoy concurrent jurisdiction. These courts are established under the Magistrate Courts Act.​[94]​ The District Courts, unlike the Resident Magistrates Courts, are found throughout all the districts in Tanzania (the local government unit.) They receive appeals from the Primary Courts, several of which will be found in one district. The resident magistrates' Courts are located in major towns, municipalities and cities, which serve as the regional (provincial) headquarters.

The primary courts are the lowest in the hierarchy and are established under the Magistrates Courts Act.​[95]​ They deal with criminal cases and civil cases. Civil cases on property and family law matters which apply customary law and Islamic law must be initiated at the level of the Primary Court, where the Magistrates sit with lay assessors. (The jury system does not apply in Tanzania).

Plea bargaining in Tanzanian courts is conducted by public prosecutors on behalf of the office of the Director for Public Prosecution.  This means that in every court where a public prosecutor can work, plea bargaining may be conducted regarding the guidelines provided by the Criminal Prosecution Act.  In the High Court and Court of Appeal, state attorney or any other legal officer appointed as a public prosecutor can conduct plea bargaining negotiations in courts. 

The majority of criminal defendants would prefer to resolve their cases by plea bargaining. As previously discussed, plea agreements are always concluded with minimal judicial input or oversight in Tanzania.​[96]​ This presents significant issues concerning transparency, fairness, and effective sentencing. Public prosecutors strongly influence sentences by the charges they select. The parties bargain informally outside of court and strike a deal, but defendants often plead guilty without a realistic understanding of their likely sentencing exposure.  Instead, they plead guilty based on their best guess as to how judges or Magistrate will resolve certain issues and their own fear that they could get an unspecified but severe post-trial sentence. The judge is often reluctant to reject the parties’ deal, partly because the judge may have little information about the case and partly because the judge lacks the resources and time to go through a review of the bargaining process.
Likewise, plea bargaining refers generally to defendants giving up their trial-related constitutional rights and pleading guilty in exchange for prosecutorial concessions, like lighter sentences and dismissals of charges. Therefore, the role of the judges and magistrates is a minor one because prosecutors are the star of the show. Prosecutors select the defendants and the charges and come to the bargaining table with the most influence. Defense lawyers make their best pitch for leniency but ultimately encourage their clients to make a deal. Judges ensure that the plea is knowing” and “voluntary” but essentially rubber-stamp most plea agreements​[97]​ and sentence the defendants according to the parties’ agreement.

Plea bargaining is largely conducted outside of the courtroom but culminates on the record with a guilty plea. Typically, after the grand jury issues, an indictment and the defendant is arraigned, the defense attorney and the prosecutor negotiate privately. Once they reach an agreement, a hearing is calendared for a change of plea. A plea agreement typically binds the prosecutor to dismiss charges or not to bring particular charges.​[98]​  The agreement often contains a sentencing recommendation that does not bind the court, although the court usually follows the recommendation. Alternatively, the agreement may contain a binding sentencing recommendation. The judge may, but very seldom does, reject a plea agreement that dismisses charges or binds the court.​[99]​ In that case, the defendant may withdraw his guilty plea.

Experience from other jurisdictions indicates that, for most defendants, their day in court is limited to short, uncontested hearings preceding a guilty plea. The sentencing differential between those defendants who plead guilty and those who are convicted after a jury trial underlies our whole system of pleas.  Put simply, defendants plead guilty primarily because they fear to get a much longer sentence if they lose at trial.​[100]​ Further experience from the USA jurisdiction suggests that prosecutors are the primary movers in federal plea bargaining. They choose their defendants and the charges, and that choice is virtually unreviewable. Often, they bring very strong cases in which a jury would almost certainly convict. The defendant thus must plead guilty, generally on plea terms favorable to the prosecution. Judges generally go along with these plea agreements because they lack resources to preside over many trials.​[101]​ 

The broad prosecutorial discretion has been introduced by the recent introduction of the plea-bargaining procedure in the criminal justice system in Tanzania.  Since plea bargaining negotiation is still new to the Tanzanian legal system, Tanzania has a lot to learn from other jurisdictions that have practice this for a long time. More important to note here is that, the role of the court to balance the rights of the accused, the victim and that of the entire public is much needed when analyzing plea bargaining agreement presented into court for judgment.  On the other hand, the constitutional power of the court which expects the court to take many roles in the proceeding of a case from the time a case is lodged in court should not be compromised by the plea-bargaining negotiation process.
3.4 	DPP Office as an Institution for Implementation of Plea Bargaining
Except in the Primary Court the task of prosecuting persons suspected of having violated the law is almost entirely undertaken by specific organs of government on behalf of the State. All criminal prosecutions are the direct concern of the Director of Public Prosecutions (DPP). He/she is appointed by the President of the United Republic from among persons qualified to practice as advocates of the High Court of the United Republic and has been so qualified for not less than five years before appointment.​[102]​

The Director of Public Prosecutions has powers in any case in which he/she considers it desirable so to do: a) to institute and undertake criminal proceedings against any person before any court (other than a court-martial) in respect of any offence alleged to have been committed by that person.  b) to take over and continue any such criminal proceedings, that have been instituted or undertaken by any other person or authority, and c) to discontinue any such criminal proceedings instituted or undertaken by him (her) or any other authority or person.​[103]​

The power of the Director of Public Prosecutions to institute or take over criminal proceedings begun by any other person is exercisable by the holder of that office alone or persons acting under his/her direction or authority. However, a person or authority that has instituted criminal proceedings may with leave of the court withdraw the proceedings.​[104]​  Further the Director of Public Prosecutions enjoys full independence and discretion in the exercise of his/her powers. The DPP may not receive any directions from any other person except the President of the United Republic.​[105]​ The Director of Public Prosecutions is assisted in the discharge of his/her functions by lawyers (State Attorneys) based at the Chambers in Dar Es Salaam as well as in the zones.

The first role of the office of the DPP is to appoint public prosecutors who are required by law to conduct plea bargaining in criminal prosecution in Tanzania.​[106]​ A person appointed as a public prosecutor shall be required to comply with directives, instructions and guidelines issued by the Director. Every public prosecutor shal1 be under superintendence and control of the Director, Law Officer or a State Attorney in charge of the zone, region, district or any other geographical division within which any such public prosecutor is situated in respect of all prosecution matters and shall be required to submit periodic returns to the Director, Law Officer or respective State Attorney.​[107]​

The law gives power to the Director of Public Prosecutions to initiate prosecutions or criminal proceedings against any person, take over any criminal proceedings begun by any person or authority whatsoever and to discontinue any criminal proceedings whether initiated by his/her office or any other person or authority. All public prosecutors are appointed by the Director of Public Prosecutions and thus subject to his/her control and supervision. However, except for those cases where his/her explicit consent is required by law before a criminal proceeding is instituted and prosecution is undertaken, the Director of Public Prosecutions may never see or know anything about a case.

In cases where the consent of the Director of Public Prosecutions is required before the institution of criminal proceedings not only would he/she demand to see the investigation file and thus evaluate the evidence, but also he/she may give guidance to the investigative agencies. Cases requiring the consent of the Director of Public Prosecutions in Tanzania are few and far between. The reason is that they comprise offences like raising discontent and ill will among the inhabitants,​[108]​ incest by males or females,​[109]​abuse of office by public officials​[110]​ and a handful of other offences, which in reality are not the most common offences.

It is also worth noting in this context that the powers of appointment of Public Prosecutors by the Director of Public Prosecutions are exercised more in general terms than in specificity. Except in rare cases where specifically named persons are appointed as public Prosecutors such appointment is more likely than not to take the form of holders of named offices, or ranks, as is the case of appointment of all Police officers holding the rank of Assistant Inspector and above to be Public Prosecutors. 

While the Director of Public Prosecutions may insist based on the law that only Police officers of the appropriate rank act as Public Prosecutors, the decision as to who becomes promoted to that rank is not that of the Director of Public Prosecutions but that of the Police Force the agency which employs the public prosecutor.  This is not a position unique to the Police agency; it is also true for other government departments where the appointment of Prosecutors is done in generic terms rather than specifically named persons.​[111]​

Despite the above limitations, the Director of Public Prosecutions does exercise a limited screening in at least three instances: serious cases of particular legal difficulty in the course of the investigation of which the Director of Criminal Investigation has found it necessary to seek his opinion, cases in which the consent of the DPP is required before a prosecution may be instituted and cases triable on indictment by the High Court. In all three instances the DPP would be able to scrutinize the case file and guide the investigation where there was a need and finally make the decision to prosecute. In up-country stations State Attorneys in the Zonal Chambers of which there are nine in conformity with the High Court Registries would do the screening.​[112]​

The Constitution excludes the police from politics. That may be a guarantee that their operational decisions including the decision to prosecute will not be politically influenced. Similarly, the DPP may not receive directions from any other person except the President of the United Republic. That is as far as guarantees can go at law. There are likely problems however. Like other Public Servants senior police officers have no security of tenure of office. On the other hand, the DPP is structurally under the Attorney General, an ex officio Member of Parliament. The Attorney General ceases to hold office with the dissolution of Parliament and has to be reappointed every five years by an incoming President.

To resolve the problem of potential arbitrary influence in the exercise of Police functions there should be certain safeguards. Such safeguards could take the form of clear provisions regarding the tenure of office of specified officers, procedures and mechanisms for their appointment and removal from office as well as their superannuation schemes.

3.5 	The Office of the President as an Institution for Implementation of Plea Bargaining
The role of the office of the president to introduce the plea-bargaining laws in Tanzania cannot be ignored for the mention in this study.  The effort to enact a law governing plea bargaining in Tanzania has been in place more than six years ago and this effort was initiated within the judiciary of Tanzania in 2013.  Piling up of cases in courts of Tanzania had made it difficult for judges and magistrates to deliver justice on time especially in criminal cases, thus the need to establish a plea-bargaining negotiation system was seen inevitable.​[113]​

The judiciary through its regulation committee had been gathering information on plea bargaining by using experience from other countries and that it was currently collecting views on the new system. It was under judiciary expectation that once approved by the government and other stakeholders, it would give a breather to our populated prisons countrywide as well as reducing a backlog of cases in our various courts which still faces a shortage of human resources.​[114]​ This proposal was emphasized by the then office of the president,​[115]​ regarding the need for timely delivery of justice and asked the police, government officials, the Prevention and Combating of Corruption Bureau and the Director of Public Prosecution to work in a unified manner to ensure that justice is done.

The office of the president being the head of the government is committed to the directive principles issued by the URT Constitution regarding promoting the welfare of the people, as a primary objective of the government.​[116]​  The government is further committed with another provision of the constitution which requires that all forms of injustice, intimidation, discrimination, corruption, oppression or favouritism are eradicated.​[117]​  The concept of Timely Delivery of Justice for All is directly pinned to this constitutional commitment.  

Following the historic directives from the office of the president to the stakeholders in the introduction of the law on plea bargaining, the bill of the law for introduction and amendment of various laws were introduced in parliament sessions in June 2019 for the first reading. The bill was later passed by the parliament and later assented into law by the president in September 2019.​[118]​ The president has issued some directives to the Director of Public Prosecution to quickly start plea bargaining negotiations to accused persons in custody, a few weeks after signing the newly amended law on plea bargaining.​[119]​

3.6 	Conclusion




LEGAL CHALLENGES RELATED TO PLEA BARGAINING NEGOTIATION

4.1 	Introduction
Plea bargaining emerged and has gained acceptance in the legal community only in the recent decade. One of the earliest indictments of plea bargaining was a 1495 English statute authorizing the prosecution of unlawful hunting before a justice of the peace.​[120]​ It provided that if a defendant confessed his crime, then he was convicted of a summary offence but if he denied his guilt, he was prosecuted as a felon. The discussion in the previous chapters suggests that the existing provisions of the plea agreement in the Criminal Procedure Act of Tanzania, do not guarantee constitutional rights of the accused and the victims’ interests in criminal trials and are only designed to ease the backlog of cases in the courts and work of the judiciary. 

4.2 	Lack of Clear Procedure in Pleas Bargaining
The procedure provided by the law to govern plea bargaining negotiation in Tanzania, requires plea bargaining negotiations to be made between the prosecutor and the accused person and his advocate if represented or, if not represented, a relative, friend or any other person legally competent to represent the accused.​[121]​ The law further provides that, the accused or his advocate or a public prosecutor may initiate plea bargaining and notify the court of their intention to negotiate a plea agreement.  The recent directives issued by DPP to call upon economic crimes accused in custody to apply for plea bargaining negotiations, required only the accused themselves to write the send the application and not their advocates or relatives on their behalf as the law requires.​[122]​ This procedure may cause difficult and injustice to the accused who cannot write due to their healthy conditions or those unable to write due to any other reasons.

When guilty plea first made its entry into the legal system it was characterized by the defendant coming forward to plead guilty without expecting any concessions but yet at the same time accepting the charges of indictment. A ‘plea agreement’, is a deal made between the defendant and the prosecutor whereby the defendant pleads guilty in exchange for a lesser charge or a reduced sentence. Justice systems that use guilty pleas to dispose of the cases usually do so by resorting to the controversial practice of plea bargaining. Plea bargaining is mostly unclear procedure involving either sentence bargaining or charge bargaining or very rarely both. Sentence bargaining refers to the practice wherein the prosecutor will recommend to the court a sentence lighter than the expected and in charge bargaining the prosecution will agree to drop certain charges.

The law on plea bargaining prohibits courts to engage in plea bargaining negotiations between an accused and the prosecutor.  This procedure undermines the constitutional right of a judiciary to dispense justice. Even though the law allows the court to reject a plea agreement, which has been obtained involuntary, there is no parameter for the court to detect a voluntary bargaining because it is never engaged in the plea-bargaining negotiation. This may lender the entire procedure of plea bargaining to be unclear before the eyes of justice.

Berlins​[123]​ highlights that an innocent person may be forced into pleading guilty and agreeing to a less harsh sentence. He points out that at times this is happens because the accused is fearful that he/she may be convicted by courts and end up facing an even worse off punishment than offered. The nature of the procedure compels accused persons to succumb to plea bargaining negotiations. For example, Tanzanian journalist Erick Kabendera was arrested late July 2019 after police said his citizenship was questionable. He was later charged with money laundering, tax evasion and involvement in organized crime offences which are all non-bailable offences which he all denied.  

He later, his lawyer appealed to the Director of Public Prosecutions (DPP) to request to enter into a plea bargain negotiation to expedite his trial.  Mr. Kabendera has been released from prison after concluding a plea-bargaining agreement with the office of DPP.​[124]​ The plea-bargaining agreement requires Mr, Kabendera to pay a total sum of Tsh. 250 Million or to have three years imprisonment.  He has been required to pay as well Tsh. 172 Million for tax evasion and Tsh. 100 million as fine for money. 
Plea bargaining negotiation has an unclear procedure, which allows an accused person to have a soft punishment or even a pardon.​[125]​  Instead of rendering the general public gets angry because criminals who are a danger to society are getting away with crime due the fact that they have struck a plea bargain deal with the prosecutor which is unfair especially with serious crimes such as murder where the prosecution would, for example, agree to a plea of guilty to accidental killing when in fact the accused will have committed murder. 
Plea bargaining negotiation is supposed to be conducted privately between the prosecutor and the accused person.​[126]​  With the introduction of new laws on Money Laundering and Economic Crimes, which are non-bailable offences, it is likely the accused person be engulfed with fear and intimidation of rotting in prison.  The public’s suspicion is increased by the way plea bargaining is conducted in such a secretive and covert manner hence why the public has reduced confidence in plea bargaining.
4.3 	Discretion Powers of the Court to Reject Plea of Bargaining
The law requires a plea-bargaining agreement to be registered in court.  The court however, required before it registers any such agreement, satisfy it that the agreement was voluntarily obtained and the accused was competent to enter into such agreement.​[127]​ A voluntary agreement is the one, which has been entered under the free will of parties without the influence of any kind.  One of the hardest undertakings the court will face is to establish the absence of free will in an agreement between one party with authority to pardon or to accuse and the other with merely powerless.  It is practically hard for the court to satisfy itself that such an agreement was voluntary because the law to engage in plea bargaining negotiations bars courts.  The bargaining is always conducted privately between the prosecutor and the accused person. 

The court may pronounce a decision based on plea agreement or make such other orders as it deems necessary including an order to reject the plea agreement for sufficient reasons, except that, such rejection shall not operate as a bar to any subsequent negotiations preferred by the parties.  The court is given power by the law to reject a bargaining agreement submitted to be recorded by parties to the bargaining agreement.​[128]​  However, such rejection must be accompanied by several reasons for such rejection.  The reasons adduced by the court do not bar parties to the bargaining to sit down and conduct fresh bargaining thereafter.  This is an obstruction for the court to dispense justice.  In such a situation, judges and magistrates may be likely to be influenced by this provision to ignore the rejection of plea bargaining as they are afraid that such a bar will never change a thing.

The court has been empowered by law to reject a plea bargaining agreement which involves the sexual offences whose punishment exceeds five years or involving victims under eighteen years; treason and treasonable offences; possession or trafficking in narcotic drugs whose market value is above twenty million shillings; terrorism; possession of Government trophy whose value is above twenty million shillings without the consent, in writing, of the Director of Public Prosecutions.​[129]​  The court is also empowered to reject a plea bargaining agreement which has been concluded in any offence as the Minister may, upon consultation with other relevant authorities and by order published in the Gazette, prescribe.​[130]​  This indicates how limited powers the court has been given to reject plea bargaining agreements in Tanzania.

4.4 	Unequal Bargaining Power in Please Bargaining
Plea bargaining agreements like any other agreement in Tanzania must be governed by the law of contract, which deals with all sorts of agreement transactions in the country.​[131]​ It is provided that, all agreements are contracts if they are made by the free consent of parties competent to contract, for a lawful consideration and with a lawful object, and are not hereby expressly declared to be void.​[132]​  Free consent is said to be free when it is not caused by- coercion, undue influence, fraud, misrepresentation and mistake.  The law further provides that, consent is said to be not free when it would have not been given but for the existence of such coercion, undue influence, fraud, misrepresentation and mistake.​[133]​

4.4.1 	Element of Coercion in the Plea-Bargaining Agreement Negotiation
Coercion is the committing or threatening to commit, any act forbidden by Penal Code, or the unlawful detaining, or threatening to detain, any property, to the prejudice of any person whatever, to cause any person to agree.  It appears that most of the accused persons in criminal cases involving plea bargaining are in prison waiting investigations for their offences to be tried in courts.​[134]​  It is because most of such offences are not bailable offences.  In the eyes of law, custody in prison is clear coercion, which may prompt the accused to easily be pushed into plea bargaining negotiations.  An accused person concluding a plea bargaining under coercion cannot be in equal bargaining power with the prosecutor who is working free to lessen or make worse his case.

4.4.2 	Element of Undue Influence in the Plea-Bargaining Negotiation
The contract is said to be induced by undue influence when the relationship subsisting between the parties are such that one of the parties are in a position to dominate the will of the other and use that position to obtain an unfair advantage over the other.  The law further provides that, a person is deemed to be in a position to dominate the will of another- where he holds a real or apparent authority over the other, or where he stands in a fiduciary relation to the other.​[135]​ In the plea bargaining negotiation, the prosecutor is embedded with automatic authority to prosecute and imprison the accused person in custody or outside custody.  This is a person with the legal power to investigate and prosecute the case, which has made the accused to be in prison.  He has power to convince the court whether the accused is guilty or not guilty before any case.  He has power to recommend freedom of the accused or guilty for the judges or magistrate to declare a verdict.  Thus, an accused person concluding a plea bargaining under such undue influence cannot be in equal bargaining power with the prosecutor who is working free to lessen or make worse his case.
4.4.3 	Element of Fraud in the Plea Bargaining Negotiation
When a party to a contract do an act to convince the other party to enter into contract by giving him suggestions which are not true and he know that are not true, or having active concealment of fact by one having knowledge or belief of the fact, or with a promise without any intention of performing it, or a mere silence as to facts likely to affect the willingness of the person to enter into a contract, such an act amount to fraud.​[136]​  Plea bargaining negotiation among an accused person convicted with an offence which has political sentiments and influence are likely to have much fraud from the prosecution side.  This is because these are merely allegations, which require serious investigation to prove the case beyond reasonable doubt.  This happens also to offences, which have evidence hardly to find, such as economic crimes, and the accused has stayed in prison for quiet long time. In the Jailos Nyandu and Others case​[137]​ Plea bargaining negotiation is such cases have no equal bargaining powers between the parties.

4.4.4 	Unequal Bargaining Power
In the plea-bargaining negotiations, the accused is always in a weaker position because he has to choose to agree so that be given a lesser punishment or disagree and receive a stiff punishment. This is a debate on justice. The procedure in plea bargaining negotiation involves a mutually satisfactory disposition of the criminal case between the accused and the prosecutor. It usually involves the defendant’s pleading guilty to a lesser offence or to only one or some of the counts of a multi-count indictment in return for a lighter sentence than that possible for the graver charge.  It is principle of law that for an agreement to be legal, parties to such an agreement must possess equal bargaining power.  Bargaining negotiation made between one party (the prosecutor) with authority to imprison or to set free the other party who in most cases rotting in prison or police custody, cannot in any means be considered a fair bargaining.
The practice shows in Tanzania that, most of the criminal cases involved in plea bargaining negotiations are cases related to economic crimes and money laundering.  These crimes are all non-bailable offences. This suggests that, negotiation is always made between the public prosecutor and the accused who is in prison.  With all desires to be freed back from prison, most accused ends up pleading guilty to the offences they have been charged.  Michael Wambura, a former secretary of the Tanzania Football Association has recently been released on the plea agreement, which gave him a soft punishment recorded at the Kisutu Resident Magistrate.
4.5 	Discretion Power of DPP
The Director of Public Prosecutions (DPP) in Tanzania is a public officer. He enjoys constitutional guarantees from the direction or control of any person or authority and is vested with wide discretionary powers to carry out his functions. The reason for of having such wide discretionary powers is precisely to enable the prosecutor to reach an appropriate decision especially that each case must be decided on its own facts and merits. Discretion allows for flexibility and enables the prosecutor to adapt his decision to existing circumstances.
 “Prosecutorial discretion” refers to the prosecution’s power to choose whether or not to bring criminal charges, and what charges to bring, in cases where the evidence would justify charges.​[138]​ Prosecutorial discretion may be the subject of abuse or very often exercised to suit the political agenda of a governing regime. The need for more visibility and accountability in the manner the prosecutor exercises his discretion cannot therefore be understated if the public is expected to have confidence in the criminal justice system. In many jurisdictions, guidelines have been promulgated to ensure consistency and to bring transparency in the decision-making process.​[139]​

The process of prosecution requires the prosecutor to engage in a series of task. First the prosecutor has to decide whether a particular act or omission by a defendant might reasonably be said to fall within the ambit of the criminal law. The prosecutor will have to consider amongst other things the evidence on file and assess the reliability of such evidence in court, the credibility of witnesses who will be called by the prosecution and the persuasiveness of any potential lines of defense likely to be raised on behalf of the defendant.  The Prosecutor has to decide whether to prosecute or not or the case may be more appropriately dealt with by means of a caution or by taking no further action at all. 

The office of the DPP of Tanzania enjoys discretionary powers to conduct plea bargaining negotiations of criminal cases in the country.  The powers are discretionary because the entire bargaining process is conducted privately between the prosecutor and the accused person without interference with a court or any other person or institution.​[140]​ This powers, enables the prosecutor to decide whether to recommend for a soft or stiff punishment to the accused person based on his/her compliance to the wish of the prosecutor.  As it may be seen from the previous chapters that the nature of the bargaining negotiation conducted by the prosecutor can easily cause the innocent accused person to succumb to the prosecutor’s agreement.  In the Priscus Shirima Case,​[141]​ parties concluded his plea-bargaining Agreement while in prison in Dar es Salaam. This is possible due to the unequal bargaining powers that exist during bargaining.

The discretionary exercise of power by the prosecutor does not stop at the pre-trial stage where a plea agreement is registered in court. It carries on even after when the court reject the plea-bargaining agreement. The prosecutor is empowered by law to initiate another plea-bargaining negotiation with the accused after the court rejects the original agreement.​[142]​  He has to present his case in a form that is both comprehensible and capable of being persuasive beyond reasonable doubt if the prosecution is to result into a conviction. He will be expected to make critical decisions as to what evidence to lead, what witnesses to call, what questions to ask and what objections to make. He may also have to decide whether to drop some of the counts on the charge sheet and whether to accept a guilty plea in return for a lesser offence.

In many instances he has to decide whether to enter a nolle prosequi. He has at the end of the day the responsibility to ensure that the exercise of that discretion is just, fair, reasonable and within constitutional limits, having regard to the surrounding circumstances of the case.

The law further gives a discretionary power to influence the accused person to agree to the bargaining agreement which in fact takes the accused’s right to make appeal on the decision to be reached by the court.​[143]​ In other words this can be said, the law gives power to the office of DPP to curtail justice to the accused especially when his right to appeal is barred by law.  He has little room for error. 

4.6 	Conclusion














The goal of modern criminal and criminal procedure legislation of most countries is not only the restoration of justice by punishing the individuals responsible for the crimes, but also the development of measures aimed at criminal phenomenon prevention. One such measure is the institution of a deal with justice, which determines the possibility of obtaining lesser sentences by suspects or accused ones than prescribed by law, as the result of cooperation with the prosecution or the court.

This study aimed at examining the effectiveness of the legal and institutional frameworks governing Plea Bargaining Negotiations in Tanzania and suggest ways to a fair plea bargaining.  Tanzania has recently introduced plea-bargaining legislation by amending the Criminal Procedure Act, CAP. 20 among others.  The need to enact a law governing plea bargaining in Tanzania has been in place more than six years ago and this effort was initiated within the judiciary of Tanzania in 2013.  

Piling up of cases in courts of Tanzania had made it difficult for judges and magistrates to deliver justice on time especially in criminal cases, thus the need to establish a plea-bargaining negotiation system was seen inevitable. This problem of delay and backlog has been more critical in a criminal case because the restraint imposed by arrest and consequent incarceration continues at all stages, be it the stage of investigation, inquiry, trial, appeal or revision.  
Determining the laws governing plea bargaining negotiations in Tanzania was one of the questions the researcher of this study has taken the effort to find.  It is well established that the Criminal Procedure Act, Cap. 20 were recently in September 2019 amended to introduce plea bargaining provisions in Tanzania.  The provisions empower the public prosecutor after consultation with the victim or investigator where the circumstances so permit, may at any time before the judgment, enter a plea bargaining arrangement with the accused and his advocate if represented or, if not represented, a relative, friend or any other person legally competent to represent the accused.  The law empowers the accused or his advocate as well to initiate a plea bargaining and notify the court of their intention to negotiate a plea agreement.

The introduced provisions of the law empower the public prosecutor after concluding the bargaining agreement, charge the accused with a lesser offence, withdraw other counts or take any other measure as appropriate depending on the circumstances of the case.  The accused may enter a plea of guilty to the offence charged or to a lesser offence or a particular count or counts in a charge with multiple counts in exchange for a withdrawal of other counts. The law gives the accused an option of either to be ordered to pay compensation or make restitution or be subjected to forfeiture of the proceeds and instrumentalities that were used to commit the crime in question.

The involvement of the court under the law on plea bargaining is at the point of registering any such agreement after it has satisfied itself that the agreement was voluntarily obtained and the accused was competent to enter into such agreement. The court may pronounce a decision based on plea agreement or make such other orders as it deems necessary including an order to reject the plea agreement for sufficient reasons, except that, such rejection shall not operate as a bar to any subsequent negotiations preferred by the parties.

According to the law on plea bargaining not all offences can be subjected to plea bargaining negotiation.  The law has mentioned several offences which cannot be brought for bargaining negotiations, namely: sexual offences whose punishment exceeds five years or involving victims under eighteen years; treason and treasonable offences; possession or trafficking in narcotic drugs whose market value is above twenty million shillings; terrorism; possession of Government trophy whose value is above twenty million shillings without the consent, in writing, of the Director of Public Prosecutions.

The Constitution of Tanzania (CAP.2) of 1977, as amended, sets out the country’s founding values and principles in its preamble and other provisions.  For the concept of plea bargaining, the preamble calls upon building a country founded on principles of freedom, justice, fraternity, and concord. Such principles could be realized through a built democratic society in which the Executive is accountable to a Legislature composed of elected members and representative of the people, and also a Judiciary which is independent and dispenses justice without fear or favour, thereby ensuring that all human rights are preserved and protected and that the duties of every person are faithfully discharged. 

Analysis of the fairness of plea-bargaining negotiations in Tanzania was another aspect the researcher of this study intended to achieve.  It has been found in this study that, the existing provisions of the plea agreement in the Criminal Procedure Act of Tanzania do not guarantee constitutional rights of the accused and the victims’ interests in criminal trials and are only designed to ease the backlog of cases in the courts and work of the judiciary.

It has been found that the laws governing plea bargaining negotiations are unclear and therefore, rendering unclear bargaining procedures.  It requires a bargaining procedure to be made between the prosecutor and the accused person and his advocate if represented or, if not represented, a relative, friend or any other person legally competent to represent the accused.​[144]​ The law further provides that, the accused or his advocate or a public prosecutor may initiate plea bargaining and notify the court of their intention to negotiate a plea agreement.  It is a principle of law that agreements made between unequal parties to the negotiation one influencing another do hardly bring a valid agreement.

It has been found that courts are given power by the law to reject a bargaining agreement submitted to be recorded by parties to the bargaining agreement.​[145]​  However, such rejection must be accompanied by several reasons for such rejection.  The reason adduced by the court does not bar parties to the bargaining to sit down and conduct fresh bargaining thereafter.  This is an obstruction for the court to dispense justice.  In such a situation, judges and magistrates may be likely to be influenced by this provision to ignore the rejection of plea bargaining as they are afraid that such a bar will never change a thing.
It has been found that most of the accused persons in criminal cases involving plea bargaining are in prison waiting investigations for their offences to be tried in courts.  It is because most of such offences are none bailable offences.  In the eyes of law, custody in prison is clear coercion, which may prompt the accused to easily be pushed into plea bargaining negotiations. An accused person concluding a plea bargaining under coercion cannot be in equal bargaining power with the prosecutor who is working free to lessen or make worse his case.
The study has also found that, in the plea-bargaining negotiation, the prosecutor is embedded with automatic authority to prosecute and imprison the accused person in custody or outside custody.  This is a person with the legal power to investigate and prosecute the case which has made the accused be in prison.  He has the power to convince the court whether the accused is guilty or not guilty before any case.  He has the power to recommend freedom of the accused or guilty for the judges or magistrate to declare a verdict.  Thus, an accused person concluding a plea bargaining under such undue influence cannot be in equal bargaining power with the prosecutor who is working free to lessen or make worse his case.
5.2 	Recommendations
A right to a speedy trial is guaranteed to every Tanzanian citizen by the constitution, specifically on the equality before the law and equal protection by law.  The defense and prosecutors in Tanzania should find plea bargaining the better alternative for quick disposal of cases.  This will make plea bargaining a constitutional and that it is an important aspect of the criminal procedure.  The researcher wishes to make the following recommendations to make plea bargaining fairer in Tanzania:
First, Plea bargaining is said to have disregarded other aspects of the criminal justice system such as the due process of the law which envisages a right to a full trial. This may be termed as due process considerations. If one agrees to plea bargaining, he forfeits some of his constitutional rights especially the right to a full trial. Other rights that are undercut as listed in the criminal procedure code, these are the presumption of innocence, examination of witnesses and right to remain silent. This does not provide procedural fairness to the accused.  The laws governing plea bargaining in Tanzania should be amended to take in the board of all above mentioned constitutional rights.

Second, Sentencing is an issue of major concern in any legal system. This requires looking at the circumstances of the case and that of the accused to make appropriate sentencing. Criminal proceedings in the adversarial system are designed to resolve a conflict over guilt or innocence. Plea bargaining focuses on what to do with the accused, that is, what sentence is the best suit for him/her. Leniency is taken into account and most aspects of the criminal procedure such as calling of witnesses are not relevant. The morality of such leniency has greatly been criticized especially in capital offences, which require the mandatory death sentence.  The laws governing plea bargaining in Tanzania should be amended to give power to the court to have control of the entire plea-bargaining procedure.

Third, the Criminal Procedure Act, Cap. 20 must be reviewed to balance the bargaining powers between powers to the bargaining negotiations.  Limiting the discretionary powers vested to prosecutors by law can do this.  The balance of the bargaining powers in necessary because most of the accused persons in these negotiations are involved in nonbailable offences.  The prosecutor, having much power over them are easily influencing them to plead guilty to offences they are accused. 
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